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This paper assesses the nature and degree of bilateral economic integration preceding and 
following the implementation of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA). 
Various price-based and quantity-based indicators of economic integration are assessed. 
Results vary depending upon the indicator; however, on balance, the results provide only 
modest evidence of incremental integration in the post-CUSTA period. The findings 
serve as a caution against managers and policymakers assuming that regional integration 
is an inevitable dynamic and basing strategies and policies around this assumption.  
 
Key words:  economic integration; free trade agreements; trade, foreign direct 
investment; price convergence.   3
 
REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: THE CANADA-U.S. EXPERIENCE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
  A prominent issue of ongoing concern to both public and private sector decision-
makers is whether international economic integration is primarily taking place on a 
regional basis or on a global basis. On the public policy side, some observers worry that 
initiatives at the regional level, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) and the European Union, are contributing to ineffectual negotiations for 
multilateral trade and investment liberalization through the World Trade Organization 
(Gordon, 2003). The recent predominance of regional agreements is seen, in turn, as 
increasing the risk of inefficient trade and investment diversion, as well as unduly 
penalizing Asian and African countries whose regional trading partners are not wealthy, 
developed countries capable of providing a large market for labor-intensive and 
agricultural products.  
On the private sector side, company strategists must identify the nature of 
economic integration in order to position their companies for competitive success. For 
example, a commitment to integrating a company’s facilities and skilled workforce on a 
regional basis would have substantially different implications for capital investment 
plans, choices of modes for entering foreign markets and the nationalities of senior 
managers, among other decisions, than would a commitment to integrate on a broader 
geographical basis (Rugman, 2000).  
  While many international business strategists have stressed the need for managers 
to develop “global” strategies and organizational structures, others have cautioned that 
economic integration is, de facto, primarily taking place on a regional basis (Rugman 
2000). The failure to acknowledge the effective “balkanization” of the world economy 
into regional “sub-economies” could lead managers to deploy resources inefficiently, as 
well as fail to couple country and firm-specific competitive advantages effectively. At the 
public policy level, a view that forces promoting integration at a regional level dominate 
forces promoting economic integration at a multilateral level might predispose   4
policymakers towards initiatives such as joining a regional currency arrangement that 
would not otherwise be favored. 
  Lost in the ongoing debate about whether regional or global integration is the 
more appropriate characterization of ongoing international business developments is the 
issue of how to identify international economic integration. Journalists and scholars 
employ a range of measures with little regard for their reliability or relevance. The 
primary purpose of this paper is to identify and assess alternative measures of 
international economic integration and to illustrate the potential for different conclusions 
to be drawn depending upon the measure(s) chosen. The analysis is sited in the context of 
the world’s largest bilateral trade relationship, i.e. that between Canada and the United 
States, although the analysis and conclusions drawn are more generally applicable. 
  The paper proceeds as follows. The second section sets out a range of measures of 
economic integration that have been used by scholars and assesses those measures from 
conceptual and empirical perspectives. The main argument made is that “price-based” 
measures of integration are arguably more meaningful than “quantity-based” measures. 
The third section focuses on price-based measures of bilateral economic integration. The 
evidence from price-based evidence is less supportive of robust bilateral economic 
integration than are quantity-based measures. The last section of the paper summarizes 
the range of evidence on economic integration between Canada and the United States and 
offers some policy conclusions. 
 
MEASURING ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
  Economists and international business scholars employ various de jure and de 
facto measures of economic integration. The former focus on the comprehensiveness of 
legal arrangements between countries designed to liberalize international trade, 
investment and labor flows. The latter focus on a range of macroeconomic variables, as 
well as statistical results from so-called gravity models.
1
 
                                                 
1 Gravity models are statistical models that identify the expected magnitudes of trade and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) flows between countries given underlying “generic” determinants of such flows. 
Differences between expected and actual magnitudes of trade and FDI are interpreted as measures of 
“border barriers.” Changes, over time, in the quantitative importance of border barriers are, in turn, taken to 
reflect changes in economic integration.   5
De Jure Measures 
  If one assumes a high initial level of autarky among potential trading partners 
owing to legal barriers to international trade and investment, it is obvious that formal 
agreements to liberalize or eliminate the major barriers can significantly encourage 
economic integration. However, when substantial levels of international trade and 
investment already exist, the marginal impacts of additional formal agreements to further 
liberalize border barriers are uncertain. This is especially true if many of the remaining 
border barriers are difficult to address through government-to-government trade 
agreements. For example, even when formal restrictions on foreign ownership are 
eliminated as part of a trade agreement, cross-border FDI might be limited by regulatory 
differences between countries that create significant “liabilities of foreignness” in the 
form of competitive disadvantages associated with limited knowledge about how to 
operate profitably in a different regulatory regime. 
  At best, legal agreements enhance the potential for increased economic 
integration; however, the extent to which this potential is realized will depend upon a 
host of factors that are outside the scope of the formal agreement(s). In this regard, it is, 
perhaps, unsurprising that econometric models sometimes fail to identify any robust 
linkages between formal trade agreements and measures of economic integration, 
including the impact of NAFTA on Canada’s trade and foreign direct investment with its 
North American partners (Acharya, Sharma and Rao, 2002). 
 
Output-Based (Absolute) Measures 
 Overwhelmingly,  de facto measures of economic integration are the dominant 
focus of empirical studies. In particular, researchers have concentrated on trade and FDI 
flows, although the precise ways in which such data are utilized vary across studies.
2 The 
simplest application of these data simply report absolute increases in regional trade and 
FDI flows as evidence of increased regional economic integration. For example, 
Hufbauer (2001) cites growing absolute trade and FDI flows between Canada and the 
United States subsequent to the implementation of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
                                                 
2 Recently, increased attention has been paid to the cross-border migration of skilled workers. See, for 
example, DeVoretz and Coulombe (2002) and Globerman (2000).   6
Agreement (CUSTA) as illustrative of integration between the two economies. Rugman 
(2000) also highlights flows of exports from Canada and Mexico to the United States as 
indicators of increased regional economic integration, along with growing absolute U.S. 
FDI stocks in Canada and Canadian FDI stocks in the United States. To be sure, absolute 
levels of bilateral trade and FDI are impressive. For example, two-way trade in goods and 
services between Canada and the United States amounted to around CDN$680 billion in 
2002 almost triple the 1992 value. 
  While relevant for many purposes, a focus on absolute levels of trade, FDI and 
labor migration is potentially misleading when seeking to identify the extent of regional 
economic integration, inasmuch as it does not take into account the implicit “counter-
factual”, i.e. given changes in the broad historical determinants of those measures of 
economic integration, are the actual levels of trade, FDI and labor migration larger or 
smaller than one would have expected based on historical experience? Indeed, if the 
overall level of economic activity (both domestic and international) is increasing faster 
than international trade flows, one might conclude that international economic integration 
is actually decreasing. Similarly, larger bilateral trade and FDI flows are not necessarily 
indicative of increased regional economic integration to the extent that trade and FDI 
flows between each of the bilateral partners and non-bilateral partners are increasing even 
more. In short, it is preferable to focus on relative flows of trade, FDI and skilled workers 
when evaluating changes in economic integration.  
 
Output-Based (Relative) Measures 
  A simple approach towards measuring economic integration between specific 
countries or regions is to measure changes in the relevant variables, e.g. trade flows, 
between the specific countries relative to the changes between each of the countries and 
the rest-of-the-world. Hence, in measuring bilateral trade intensity between Canada and 
the United States, one might focus on each country’s share of exports and imports with 
the other. Tables 1-4 report measures of bilateral trade and FDI intensity for the post-
1980 period. Specifically, Table 1 shows Canada’s share of U.S. merchandise exports and 
imports, while Table 2 shows the U.S. share of Canada’s merchandise exports and 
imports. Of particular interest is the behavior of these measures of bilateral integration in   7
the post-1986 period, as the CUSTA was implemented in 1986. The only notable increase 
in bilateral integration is the substantial increase in the U.S. share of Canada’s exports.  
Bilateral FDI intensity can be evaluated by focusing in each country’s share of the 
other country’s inward and outward FDI stocks or flows. In this regard, it is noteworthy 
that Canada’s share of U.S. inward and outward FDI decreased in the post-1986 period 
(Table 3), while the U.S. share of Canada’s outward FDI stock also decreased. Only a 
very modest increase in the U.S. share of Canada’s inward FDI stock (Table 4) is 
consistent with an increase in bilateral economic integration. In short, only an increase in 
the relative share of Canada’s exports going to the U.S. attests to a robust increase in 
regional economic integration in the post-CUSTA period. 
  The use of the indicators summarized in Tables 1-4 implicitly assumes that the 
influence of factors not directly related to trade policy initiatives (i.e. CUSTA) stayed 
constant over the sample period. This may not be true. For example, economic growth 
rates may have varied across countries such that trade and FDI between the U.S. and 
European and Asian countries were especially stimulated. Changes in exchange rates may 
also have influenced the behavior of the indicators of economic integration summarized 
in Tables 1-4. In this regard, gravity models represent a potential improvement over 
simple comparisons of relative bilateral trade and FDI by utilizing structural models of 
trade. That is, gravity models explicitly or implicitly incorporate other influences besides 
formal trade liberalization initiatives in empirical evaluations of economic integration. 
 
Gravity Models  
  Gravity models incorporate the influence of factors such as national economic 
growth on the direction of trade and FDI flows so that the impact of trade liberalization 
measures can be reliably identified.
3 Estimates of so-called border effects build upon the 
structure of gravity models by comparing actual trade and FDI flows across and within 
countries or regions to potential flows between and within countries or regions, where the 
“potential” volumes of trade and FDI are estimated through structural (gravity) models. 
McCallum (1995) and Helliwell (1998) document the existence of substantial border 
effects in the Canada-U.S. context. Simply put, there is much less North-South trade 
                                                 
3 A technical discussion of gravity models and their interpretation can be found in Helliwell (1998).   8
relative to intra-Canada trade than one would expect given the size of the U.S. economy 
relative to provincial economies in Canada. Helliwell (1998) specifically examines the 
impact of the CUSTA on border effects for Canada’s trade flows. His estimates cover the 
period 1988-1996. He finds that the average border effect was constant from 1988-1990 
and then fell substantially from 1990-1993. No change was identified from 1993-1996 so 
that the border effect in 1996 was the same as in 1993 and about 60 percent of the 
estimated 1990 value.  
  Interestingly, Helliwell finds that export border effects fell more than import 
border effects over the sample period. Given the substantially lower average tariff levels 
in the U.S. compared to Canada in the period immediately preceding the implementation 
of the CUSTA, one would have expected the direction of the relative border effect 
change to be the opposite of that identified by Helliwell, if de jure reductions in trade 
barriers were important factors stimulating increased economic integration.  In this 
regard, Lee’s (2002) review of a number of statistical studies is suggestive. Specifically, 
he concludes that the buoyant U.S. economy and the depreciation of the Canadian dollar 
were mainly responsible for the dramatic increase in Canadian exports to the United 
States in the 1990s. In contrast, the CUSTA and NAFTA Agreements are estimated to 
account for only around 9 percent of increased Canadian exports to the United States.  
  Gravity models have also been used to estimate the impact of formal trade 
agreements on regional economic integration through FDI flows. Buckley, Clegg, 
Forsans and Reilly (2000) find that U.S. FDI in Canada into Canada was encouraged by 
the implementation of CUSTA and NAFTA, although changes in the exchange rate also 
promoted FDI. Globerman and Shapiro (1999) identify an increase in Canadian inward 
and outward FDI in the period subsequent to CUSTA (including the period covered by 
NAFTA) holding other determinants of FDI flows constant. Outward flows are larger 
than inward flows; however, it is doubtful that the CUSTA, per se, encouraged an 
increase in Canadian outward FDI, since the increase was primarily directed at Western 
Europe. Eden and Monteils (2000) are also skeptical about the impact of formal free trade 
agreements on the magnitude of regional FDI flows. Specifically, they conclude that 
MNCs making intra-regional foreign investments in North America engaged in 
“locational reshufflings” as they rationalized their investments on a continental basis.   9
  Other gravity-type models examine the linkages between trade growth and trade 
liberalization at the industry level. For example, Clausing (2001) focuses on trade flows 
at the 10-digit (harmonized) industry level. She finds that U.S. tariff reductions mandated 
by the CUSTA were responsible for over one-half of the $42 billion increase in U.S. 
imports from Canada over the 1989-1994 period. Trefler (1999) examines the change in 
the growth rate of Canadian imports from the United States over two time periods 
corresponding to before and after the implementation of the CUSTA. He concludes that 
Canadian tariff reductions explain roughly half of the observed increase in Canadian 
imports from the United States. Schwanen (1997) compares the growth in trade of 
liberalized and non-liberalized sectors (under the CUSTA), as well as the increase in 
trade with the United States compared to other countries. He finds that over the 1988-
1995 period, Canadian exports to the United States grew 139 percent in liberalized 
sectors and 64 percent in non-liberalized sectors. Exports to non-U.S. destinations in 
liberalized sectors grew only around 35 percent, whereas exports to non-U.S. destinations 
in non-liberalized sectors increased by around 54 percent. Imports show a similar pattern 
with growth highest for Canadian imports from the U.S. in liberalized sectors. It might be 
noted that Schwanen excludes motor vehicles from his analysis. This is the single largest 
source of bilateral trade, and it is a sector that enjoyed free trade prior to the CUSTA. 
Had this sector been included, the findings linking CUSTA to increased bilateral trade 
flows would have been substantially weakened. 
 
Summary of Output-Based Measures 
  In summary, most studies of regional economic integration have focused on 
changes in output-based quantity flows, most notable merchandise trade and FDI flows, 
between regional trading partners. Increased intra-regional trade and FDI intensities are 
taken to be indirect measures of increased regional economic integration. Within the 
Canada-U.S. context, most measures of intra-regional trade and FDI intensity at the 
aggregate level show surprisingly little evidence of increased bilateral economic 
integration, notwithstanding large absolute increases in bilateral trade and FDI flows. 
Statistical gravity models estimate the summary impact of all manner of “border barriers” 
to trade and FDI between countries. The few available post-CUSTA studies at the   10
macroeconomic level suggest some decrease has taken place in border barriers between 
Canada and the United States, although the relevant evidence is weak and inconsistent 
across the available studies. Stronger evidence that CUSTA promoted bilateral economic 
integration is provided by gravity-type statistical studies at the industry level. However, 
the results of industry studies are sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of specific 
industries. 
 
Measures of Competitive Impact- Productivity 
  The most immediate impact of reduced barriers to cross-border trade and 
investment is increased competition within the region. Hence, it seems reasonable to 
evaluate changes in the degree of economic integration within a region by examining 
indicators of competition. In this regard, economists have focused attention on 
productivity performance as an important indicator of competitive pressure. In particular, 
Canadian economists have long argued that free trade with the United States would 
encourage Canadian firms to better exploit available economies of scale at the product 
and plants levels, and thereby promote a convergence of productivity levels in Canadian 
and U.S. industries (Cox and Harris, 1985). Specifically, the reduction or elimination of 
barriers to trade should make lower cost imports available to domestic consumers. 
Domestic firms, in turn, must be able to meet the competition supplied by lower priced 
available imports. If domestic firms have higher unit costs than foreign suppliers, the 
former can only meet the latter’s competitive threat by improving their productivity 
relative to foreign suppliers.  
  Two relatively recent studies focus specifically on the linkages between the 
CUSTA and productivity performance at the industry level. Trefler (1999) relates 
changes in value-added per worker at the 4-digit level to Canadian tariff reductions under 
the CUSTA. He finds that Canadian tariff reductions increased value-added per worker in 
Canadian industries, although this was not uniformly true in all statistical specifications. 
More recently, Head and Ries (2003) examine the relationship between tariff levels and 
multi-factor productivity (MFP) for 22 two-digit Canadian manufacturing industries. In 
one exercise, they calculate the average of tariff reductions and the average of MFP for 
each industry group over the period 1961-1997. High tariff industries lagged in average   11
productivity until the late 1980s. Following the implementation of the CUSTA in 1989, 
the high tariff industries rapidly caught up to the low tariff industries in terms of MFP 
and even surpassed them for several years. On the other hand, when the authors 
attempted to hold constant other factors that might influence MFP besides tariff changes 
by specifying and estimating a multivariate regression model, they were unable to 
identify a robust statistically significant MFP difference between high and low tariff 
industries. 
 
Product and Factor Prices 
  As barriers to the movement of inputs and final outputs between members of a 
regional trading arrangement are reduced or eliminated, there should be an intensification 
of trade among member countries. In the neoclassical economic model, an intensification 
of trade should lead to an equalization of prices net of transport costs and taxes (Hine, 
1994). Furthermore, since trade is a substitute for factor movements in the neoclassical 
model, increased trade should also lead to a convergence of wages and returns to capital 
within the region. To the extent that direct factor movements are stimulated by 
differences in wage rates and rates-of-return, increased cross-border flows of capital and 
labor, perhaps facilitated by formal trade agreements, should further contribute to a 
convergence of returns to factors of production within the integrating region. 
  Is there any reason to favor price-based measures of economic integration over 
quantity-based measures? The theory of contestable markets suggests that price 
convergence is perhaps a more generally relevant indicator of regional economic 
integration than are quantity flows of outputs and inputs. Specifically, the theory of 
contestable markets makes the fundamental point that the threat of substantial new entry 
into domestic industries can cause monopoly prices to decline to competitive levels 
without actual entry taking place. Moreover, the threat of new entry can lead to 
reductions in X-inefficiency or higher than necessary costs that, in turn, are encouraged by 
the protection from more efficient competitors enjoyed by incumbent producers. This, in 
turn, should also contribute to domestic suppliers charging lower prices.  In the limit, the 
mere threat of new competition from imports can promote cross-border price 
convergence without any significant increases in import volumes.   12
  As a consequence of this insight, as well as the fact that much less attention has 
been paid to price-based measures of regional economic integration, we focus particular 
attention upon that measure of bilateral economic integration. 
 
CONVERGENCE OF PRICES  
  As noted above, an important measure of increased economic integration is the 
convergence of costs borne by businesses and of prices paid by consumers. With 
integrated markets, there should be a single price for any commodity if transportation 
costs, price-cost margins and taxes don’t impede price equalization. In the presence of 
such impediments, prices should converge to relative equality. That is, prices should 
differ by no more than the relevant transaction costs. Hence, the degree of convergence of 
prices and costs is a measure of the degree of economic integration. 
 
Final Goods Prices 
  The effect of trade liberalization on price convergence has been examined in 
studies by Engel and Rogers (1998) and Beling Yan (2002). Engel and Rogers examine 
city and province-level consumer price index (CPI) series for 14 broad expenditure 
categories. Their method involved calculating relative prices for pairs chosen from 
fourteen cities (in the U.S.) and ten provinces (in Canada). Their hypothesis is that 
changes in cross-border relative prices for a given CPI category should be smaller the 
greater the degree of market integration. The size of a relative price change was, in turn, 
calculated by the standard deviation of the relative price. The authors conclude that 
changes in cross-border relative prices were no smaller after the implementation of the 
CUSTA than they were before the CUSTA by comparing the period 1978-88 to 1994-97. 
Hence, they conclude that price convergence between Canada and the United States was 
not accelerated by formal trade liberalization. 
  Unlike Engel and Rogers, Yan (2002) uses actual prices rather than price indexes 
and can thereby focus on differences in price levels. Yan uses paired Canada-U.S. final 
user prices of 168 business commodities for 1985, 1990, 1993 and 1996 to calculate 
deviations from the law of one price for each commodity. Specifically, she looks at 
averages of logged values of deviations for three types of general groups: 1. non-tradable   13
commodities such as services and trade-restricted goods such as milk; 2. differentiated 
tradable goods such as appliances and clothing, and 3. homogeneous tradable goods such 
as rice, fresh fruit and fish. Yan identifies a “V-shaped” pattern in the average deviation 
data. That is, average deviations for the three categories of products declined from 1985-
1990 and then increased. Hence, there is no persistent tendency for absolute prices to 
converge over the sample period.  
  What the results for average deviations don’t reveal is the degree of convergence 
of deviations from the law of one price for individual goods, i.e. the degree of relative 
price convergence.  The deviation from the law of one price (calculated by Yan as the 
variance of the average price difference) for individual products is reported in Figure 
One, albeit as an average for each of the three general groups. Relative price deviations 
generally increased for homogeneous traded goods after 1985. Indeed, in 1996, the 
overall variance was roughly double its 1985 value. Conversely, calculated variances 
actually fell for both non-tradable commodities and differentiated tradable goods, with 
non-tradable commodities showing the largest decline in variance.
4 Since, by definition, 
cross-border competition in non-tradables does not exist, the convergence of relative 
prices in this category is presumably unrelated to economic integration. On balance, 
therefore, Yan’s evidence offers equivocal evidence on the degree to which final goods 
prices in Canada and the U.S. tended towards greater equality from 1985-1996. 
 
Costs of Labor 
  To date, there has been relatively little analysis of the labor market effects of trade 
liberalization on relative wages in Canada and the United States. This is partly due to a 
lack of comparable occupational data, at least for long periods of time. In particular, 
Canada does not provide earnings data by occupation and the industry data in Canada are 
not always comparable to industry definitions in the United States.
5 One existing source 
of Canada-U.S. labor cost comparisons is the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
                                                 
4 The patterns in Figure One seem to contradict Yan’s results based on price differences averaged across 
individual products. The key to reconciling her results is the recognition that the variance of individual 
product price differences can increase even as the average value of the differences across prices gets closer 
to zero. Simply put, positive and negative deviations from the law of one price can cancel out when 
averaged over a basket of goods. 
5 This problem will be reduced as data using the NAICS industry classification become available for both 
countries in 2003.   14
indexes of hourly manufacturing compensation that are available for the U.S. and several 
foreign countries, including Canada. These series are available from 1991 through 2001, 
and the results are shown in Figure Two. This graph shows diverging trends in labor costs 
over the post-CUSTA period, with declining relative labor costs in Canada.
6
  Similar trends appear when average weekly earnings are compared for 
manufacturing, transportation equipment and lumber. For each industrial sector, the 
weekly wage increased in the United States relative to Canada, so that labor costs are 
uniformly lower in Canada by the end of the sample period (1991-2001).
7 While the 
levels of relative labor cost differ by industrial sector, the trends are almost identical for 
each sector. The increased divergence between industrial wages in Canada and the U.S. is 
consistent with a declining Canadian dollar combined with “sticky” nominal wages. 
 
Costs of Capital 
  Integration of the Canadian and U.S. economies should lead to a convergence of 
costs of capital and rates-of-return on investment. At the margin, the cost of capital 
should equal the return on capital. Cross-border investment flows should tend to equate 
these returns and costs. Divergence between returns on capital in the two countries could 
reflect, among other things, barriers to non-resident investment in certain sectors (such as 
banking, broadcasting, or health care in Canada) or risk premia related to exchange rate 
risk or political risk. 
  One method of examining the convergence of rates-of-return in Canada and the 
United States is to examine firm-level data on profitability such as return on equity 
(ROE) or return on investment (ROI). The Compustat database has measures of these two 
returns using the following definitions: 
 
ROE = Income Before Extraordinary Items/Common Equity 
ROI = Income Before Extraordinary Items/(Long-term Debt + Common Equity +  
    .Preferred Stock + Minority Interest) 
 
                                                 
6 The graph in Figure 2 uses the market exchange rate to convert Canadian dollars. 
7 Wage comparisons for these individual sectors are not shown in order to conserve space. The relevant 
data are available upon request.   15
  Values for these two measures of the return on capital invested are presented in 
Figure Three. The U.S. series is the average of returns for the companies in the S&P 500 
index while the Canadian series is for the TSE 300 index. Unfortunately, the Compustat 
data for Canada begins in 1988 (for ROI) and 1989 (for ROE), and this does not permit a 
long-term comparison. In the event, the bottom panel of Figure Three examines the 
spread between returns in the United States and Canada and shows little evidence of 
convergence of rates-of-return on capital, with the possible exception of 2001 where the 
deeper economic downturn in the U.S. is apparent. 
  Another source of profitability data is the national accounts. Professor John 
Rodgers of Western Washington University has compiled comparable measures of the 
profit rates for Canada and the United States. Rodgers defines the net profit rates (NPR) 
as: 
 
NPR = (Output – Total Compensation – Depreciation)/Net Capital Stock 
 
  One advantage of using Rodgers’ data to measure the return on capital is that it 
does not require the use of firm-level accounting data but rather relies on national 
accounts data. Recent concerns over standards at public accounting firms has led to 
increased reliance on profitability measures based on national accounts. Rodgers’ data 
(shown in Figure Four for the manufacturing sector) does show a definite trend toward 
convergence of profit rates in Canada and the U.S., but it appears that this trend mainly 
occurred before 1980. Moreover, the convergence is mainly due to a marked decline in 
the net profit rate in U.S. manufacturing from 1965-1980. While increased integration 
between the two economies during this period (particularly integration related to the 
Canada-U.S. Auto Pact) could have reduced differences in rates-of-return to capital, it 
seems implausible that integration-driven equalization would have happened almost 
exclusively through adjustment of the net profit rate in the United States. 
  In summary, data for final output and factor inputs suggest that there has been 
little convergence of prices in the two countries in the post-CUSTA period. Furthermore, 
the limited convergence that can be observed does not appear to be a consequence of 
formal trade liberalization. The persistent and substantial departures from absolute, or   16
even relative, price convergence are strongly at odds with widespread claims that the 
CUSTA and NAFTA have led to a tightly integrated North American economy. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
  The available evidence on the extent of bilateral economic integration in the post-
CUSTA period is both eclectic and ambiguous. In particular, standard output-based 
measures of economic integration show no consistent evidence of intra-regional trade and 
FDI intensity at the macroeconomic level. Industry-level studies of trade flows provide 
stronger support for bilateral economic integration, although there is some sensitivity of 
the results to the inclusion or exclusion of major trade sectors. Arguably the most 
relevant measure of economic integration is the convergence of prices of tradable goods 
in Canada and the United States. This measure provides no consistent support for the 
claim that the two economies have become more integrated in the post-CUSTA period. In 
this regard, available evidence highlights the potential for drawing different conclusions 
about the nature and extent of regional economic integration depending upon the specific 
measure(s) of integration utilized. 
  The ambivalent evidence on bilateral economic integration also raises substantive 
questions about why CUSTA, NAFTA and other government initiatives have not 
produced more compelling indications of bilateral integration and what policies to 
promote further integration might be implemented. It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
offer any extended answers to these questions. One explanation offered for the observed 
integration experience following the CUSTA, offered by Helliwell (2001), among others, 
is that the Canadian and U.S. economies were already so tightly integrated prior to the 
CUSTA that additional efforts by governments and businesses to link the economies even 
more tightly were bound to have modest results. This explanation is unsatisfying, since 
there was, in fact, a marked increase in Canada’s export intensity with the United States 
which is consistent with the previously cited finding of Helliwell that border barriers to 
exports from Canada to the U.S. showed a significant decline in the post-CUSTA period, 
albeit not so for U.S. exports to Canada. A robust explanation of the post-CUSTA 
regional economic integration experience seemingly needs to explain the substantial   17
growth in Canada’s bilateral export intensity along with continuing departures from price 
convergence in tradable goods’ markets. 
  
  An obvious explanation candidate is the bilateral exchange rate regime. The 
available empirical evidence is persuasive in showing that exchange rate volatility has 
substantial impacts on trade and FDI flows.  The most impressive empirical evidence on 
the linkage between stable currency values and trade flows is provided by Frankel and 
Rose (2002). They show that belonging to a currency union or currency board triples 
trade with other union or board members, and there is no evidence of trade diversion at 
the expense of non-members.
8 In a similar spirit, Globerman and Shapiro (2003) show 
that countries with exchange rates pegged to the U.S. dollar attract more U.S. FDI than 
do other countries.
9 To the extent that the bilateral exchange rate regime became more 
volatile in the post-CUSTA period, it might help explain the modest extent of bilateral 
economic integration characterizing the post-CUSTA period. It might also help explain 
the failure of absolute or relative prices to converge across the two countries. 
Specifically, fluctuating exchange rates combined with relatively sticky domestic prices 
contribute to larger departures from the law of one price. 
  Figure 5 illustrates the volatility of the Canada-U.S. bilateral exchange rate over 
the past thirty years.
10 It suggests an upward trend in volatility in the post-CUSTA period,  
which is confirmed by an (statistically significant) increase in the average value of the 
12-month moving standard deviation volatility measure of about 15 percent between 
1980-88 and 1989-2003. The increase in volatility is most pronounced after 1997. The 
potential for the bilateral exchange rate regime to have discouraged post-CUSTA 
economic integration becomes even more plausible when the volatility of the Canada-
U.S. exchange rate is compared with that of the U.S. dollar relative to other currencies. 
Figure 6 shows the volatility of the Canada-U.S. exchange rate to that of the trade-
weighted U.S. exchange rate with major currencies. While the Canada-U.S. dollar 
                                                 
8 To be sure, there is no unanimity surrounding the linkage between trade flows and the stability of 
exchange rate regimes. For an argument that the level of trade is not necessarily higher under a fixed rate 
regime, see Bacchetta and Wincoop (1998). 
9 Other research reporting similar results are discussed in their study. 
10 Following Deveraux and Lane (2003), we measure exchange rate volatility by calculating the standard 
deviation of the first difference of the natural log of the monthly exchange rate.   18
relationship is generally more stable than the trade weighted foreign currency index-U.S. 
dollar relationship, the former becomes significantly more volatile relative to the latter in 
the post-CUSTA period. Taking the pre- and post-CUSTA averages, the average value of 
the relative exchange rate volatility index increases by (a statistically significant) 42 
percent. 
  Figure 7 reports an index of the value of the U.S. dollar relative to the Canadian 
dollar and also relative to other major currencies. It shows that the Canadian dollar has 
experienced two periods of pronounced depreciation in the post-1973 period along with 
an appreciation over the period 1987 to approximately 1992.
11 Relative to an index of 
major currencies (including the Canadian dollar), the Canadian dollar appreciated relative 
to foreign currencies over the period 1973-1987 and depreciated against those currencies 
over the period 1992-2002.  
  It is well known that with incomplete pass-through of exchange rate changes to 
domestic prices, real exchange rates will diverge from nominal exchange rates and 
relative prices (expressed in a common currency) will change within a trading region, 
other things constant.
12 However, it would not seem that patterns of appreciation and 
depreciation of the Canadian dollar are closely linked to observed patterns of bilateral 
trade and FDI flows. For example, the consistent increasing relative importance of the 
U.S. to Canadian exporters over the entire period 1980-2001 is inconsistent with the 
appreciation of the Canadian dollar relative to the currencies of other major exporters to 
the U.S. over the period 1973-1987. Also, the very modest changes in the U.S. share of 
Canadian imports is seemingly inconsistent with the marked changes in the value of the 
U.S. dollar relative to other foreign currencies when measured against the Canadian 
dollar.
13 Changes in Canada’s share of U.S. exports and imports also fail to show any 
obvious linkage to the exchange rate patterns exhibited in Figure 5. 
                                                 
11 It should be noted that in Figure 5, higher values of the currency index show that more foreign currency 
units are required to purchase a U.S. dollar with the ratio scale indexed to a 1989 base year value of 100.  
12 A comprehensive review of the theory and available evidence on the pass-through of exchange rate 
changes and related phenomena is provided in Goldberg and Knetter (1997). 
13 This observation is implicit in the convergence and divergence of the two functions exhibited in Figure 5. 
Convergence of the functions shows that buyers can purchase more equivalent amounts of U.S. dollars and 
other foreign currencies per Canadian dollar with the converse interpretation for periods when the functions 
are diverging.   19
  In summary, the bilateral exchange rate relationship does not appear to offer a 
comprehensive explanation of patterns of regional economic integration pre- and post-
CUSTA, although the volatility of the exchange rate relationship may well be an 
important factor blunting the forces of regional economic integration. Policymakers 
calling for closer bilateral economic integration might be well advised to reconsider the 
adverse role being played by the fluctuating exchange rate regime in North America. At 
the same time, corporate strategists should be cautious in building diversification and 
competitive strategies around the hard view that regional economic integration is an 
immutable and dominant environmental feature.  
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Table 1 
Canada’s Share of U.S. Merchandise Exports and Imports 
(Percent of Total) 
 
 
 1980  1981-85  1986-90  1991-95  1996-2001 
 
Exports  17  19  20 18 19 
Imports  16  18  17 17 18 
 






U.S. Share of Canada’s Merchandise Exports and Imports 
(Percent of Total) 
 
 
 1980  1981-85  1986-90  1991-95  1996-2001 
 
Exports 61  70  72  79  85 
Imports 68  69  65  64  68 
 
 








Canada’s Share of U.S. Inward and Outward FDI Stocks  
(Percent of Total) 
 
   1980   1986   1992   1996-2001 
   (Stock)   (Stock)   (Stock)   (Flow) 
 
Inward    14       9       9   7 
Outward   21   17     n.a.   10 
 
 
Source: Rugman and Gestrin (1994), Graham and Krugman (1995) and the US 







U.S. Share of Canada’s Inward and Outward FDI Stocks  
(Percent of Total) 
 
 
   1986   1990   1995   2001 
Inward    72   64   67     67 
Outward 69   61   52     51 
 
Source:  Evans (2002) and Industry Canada (2001) 
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Source:  Table 6 of Yan (2002) 
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Figure 2:  BLS Indexes of Hourly Manufacturing Compensation Costs  
























































Sources:  BLS web site, series INU0007US0, and INU0007CA0. 
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